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NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE RESTRICTIONS ON
COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR PLAYERS' SERVICES
While Joe- Kapp attended the University of California and was
a prospective professional football player, the Washington Redskins
"drafted" him pursuant to the "draft rule."1 The Redskins did not
make a satisfactory offer to Kapp, but kept him on their reserve list
for seven years (until April, 1966) during which time other National
Football League (hereinafter referred to as NFL) clubs were barred
from negotiating with him. Denied an opportunity to play professional football in the United States, Joe Kapp was forced to go to
Canada and play in the Canadian Football League. After an abortive
attempt to play for the Houston Oilers, 2 Kapp obtained clearance
from the NFL to play for the Minnesota Vikings when the latter paid
his Canadian team $50,000 for his release. Kapp played for the Vikings
during 1967 and 1968; the Vikings then exercised their "option
clause" for a third year, 1969,3 during which Kapp contributed considerably to the Vikings NFL championship and participation in the
Super Bowl. Kapp declined to sign a new contract with the Vikings
when they refused to increase his salary. Two other clubs, the Philadelphia Eagles and Houston Oilers, requiring a quarterback of Kapp's
ability, expressed interest, but neither followed with an offer. Kapp
maintains this was because the teams were restrained by the "Rozelle
1. The National Football League Constitution and Bylaws provide:
§ 14.3(A) At each Selection Meeting each club participating therein, shall
select players of its own choice ....
"14.5 The selecting club shall have the exclusive right to negotiate for the
services of each player selected by it in the Selection Meeting. Selected
players shall be placed on a Reserve List of that club.
Brief for Plaintiff at 15-16, Kapp v. National Football League, Civil No. 72-537
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 20, 1974) (hereinafter cited as Brief).
2. On February 10, 1967, Joe Kapp signed a contract to play for the Houston
Oilers. However, on April 12, 1967, after the NFL and American Football League had
agreed to merge, the Kapp-Oiler contract was declared invalid by Commissioner Rozelle and by the then President of the American Football League, pursuant to an
understanding with the Canadian Football League that players would not be permitted
to switch from one league to another, if already under contract.
3. Section 10 of the "Standard Player Contract" gives the team owner a unilateral option to renew the contract for a further term of one year at a reduced rate
of compensation, that is, for 90 percent of the sum paid to the player for the previous
year. Brief 22.
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rule."4 Eventually, the New England Patriots, who were desperately in
need of a quarterback, sought assurances from the Minnesota Vikings
concerning what consideration would be required as a "ransom" in
the event the Patriots employed Kapp. An agreement was worked
out,5 and Kapp signed a contract to play for the Patriots for the remainder of the 1970 season, for all of 1971 and 1972, at a total compensation of $600,000. In January, 1971, after Kapp had played 11
games for his new team, the Patriots, acting pursuant to the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, 6 and at the direction of the Commissioner, sent
Kapp a "Standard Player Contract. ' 1 He refused to sign. This refusal
4. Section 12.1 (H) of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws provide:
Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such a manner, thereafter signed
a contract with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two League clubs, the
Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one or more
players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection list (including future selection
choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion
deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be
final and conclusive.
Id. at 23.
5. The Patriots agreed to surrender to the Vikings, pursuant to the Rozelle rule,
their first round draft choice for 1972 and, in addition, their first draft selection of
1967.
6. The NFL Constitution and Bylaws provide:
§ 15.1 All contracts between clubs and players shall . . . be in the form
adopted by the member clubs of the league; such contracts shall be known as
the "Standard Player Contract." . . . [A] club may delete portions of or
otherwise amend the Standard Players Contract subject to the right of the
Commissioner to disapprove the same, as provided by Section 15.4 hereof.
§ 15.4 The Commissioner shall have the power to disapprove any contract
between a player and a club executive in violation of or contrary to the Constitution or By-laws of the League, or if either Contracting Party is or has
been guilty of conduct detrimental to the League or to professional football.
Brief 19.
7. The Standard Player Contract provides:
§ 4. The Player agrees at all times to comply with and be bound by: the
Constitution and By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the League, of the Club,
and the decisions of the Commissioner of the League . . . which shall be
final, conclusive and unappealable. The enumerated Constitution, By-Laws,
Rules and Regulations are intended to include the present Constitution, ByLaws, Rules and Regulations as well as all amendments thereto, all of which
are by reference incorporated herein. If the Player fails to comply with said
Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, the Club shall have the right
to terminate this contract . . . or to take such other action as may be specified in said Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, or as may be directed by the Commissioner. The Player agrees to submit himself to the discipline of the League and of the Club, for any violation of said Constitution,
By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, subject, however, to the right to a hearing by
the Commissioner. All matters in dispute between the Player and the Club
shall be referred to the Commissioner and his decision shall be accepted as
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was based on the fact that the Standard Player Contract provides in
part that the player will be bound by the constitution, bylaws, rules and
regulations of the league, subject only to the rights of a hearing by
the Commissioner whose decision is final and unappealable. By signing this agreement, Kapp would have bound himself to all the rules
that previously had been used against him to restrict competition for
his services, that is, the draft rule, tampering rule,8 option clause,
final, complete, conclusive, binding and unappealable, by the Player and by
the Club. The Player, if involved or affected in any manner whatsoever by
a decision of the Commissioner, whether the decision results from a dispute
between the Player and the Club or otherwise, hereby releases and discharges
the Commissioner, the League, each Club in the League, each Director, Officer,
Stockholder, Owner or Partner of any Club in the League, each employee,
agent, official or representative of the League or of any Club in the League,
jointly and severally, individually and in their official capacities, of and from
any and all claims, demands, damages, suits, actions and causes of action
whatsoever, in law or in equity, arising out of or in connection with any
decision of the Commissioner, except to the extent of awards made by the
Commissioner to the Player. The Player hereby acknowledges that he has
read the present said Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, and that
he understands their meaning.
"6 [Ilf, in the opinion of the Head Coach, Player does not maintain
himself in such excellent physical condition or fails at any time during the
football seasons included in the terms of this contract to demonstrate sufficient skill and capacity to play professional football of the caliber required
by the League, or by the Club, or if in the opinion of the Head Coach the
Player's work or conduct in the performance of this contract is unsatisfactory
as compared with the work and conduct of other members of the Club's squad
of players, the Club shall have the right to terminate this contract.

§ 11. Player acknowledges the right and power of the Commissioner (a)
to fine and suspend, (b) to fine and suspend for life or indefinitely, and/or
(c) to cancel the contract of, any player . . . who is guilty of any conduct
detrimental to the welfare of the League or of professional football. The
Player, if involved or affected in any manner whatsoever by a decision of the
Commissioner in any of the aforesaid cases, hereby releases and discharges
the Commissioner, the League, each Director, Officer, Stockholder, Owner,
Partner, employee, agent, official or representative of any Club in the
League, jointly and severally, individually and in their official capacities, of
and from any and all claims, demands, damages, suits, actions, and causes
of action whatsoever, in law or in equity, arising out of or in connection with
any such decision of the Commissioner.
Brief 20-21.
8. Section 9.2 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws provide:
If a Member Club or any officer, shareholder, director, partner, employee,
agent or representative thereof, or any person holding an interest in said
club shall tamper, negotiate with, or make an offer to a player on the Active, Reserve or Selection list of another Member Club, then . . . the offending club, in addition to being subject to all other penalties provided in the
Constitution and By-laws, shall lose its selection choice in the next succeeding Selection Meeting in the same round in which the affected player was
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and Rozelle rule. In July, 1971, the Patriots instituted a grievance
procedure against Kapp pursuant to the NFL Constitution and Bylaws,9 complaining that he had refused to sign a Standard Player Contract. Commissioner Rozelle, upon review of the grievance, reaffirmed
his previous decision by ordering Kapp to sign a Standard Player Conoriginally selected in the Selection Meeting in which he was originally
chosen . .
. Additionally, if the Commissioner decides such offense was
intentional, the Commissioner shall have the power to fine the offending club
and may award the offended club 50% of the amount of the fine imposed
by the Commissioner.
Id. at 16 n.13.
9. The NFL Constitution and Bylaws provide:
§ 8.3 The Commissioner shall have full, complete, and final jurisdiction
of:
(a) Any dispute involving two or more members of the League
certified to him by any of the disputants.
(b) Any dispute between any player, coach or other employee of
any member of the League.
(c) Any dispute between players employed by the Member Clubs
of the League other than disputes unrelated to and outside the course
and scope of the employment of such persons as players in the
League.
(d) Any dispute between a player and any official of the League.
(e) Any dispute involving a member or members in the League,
or any players or employees of the members or the League, or any
combination thereof, that in the opinion of the Commissioner constitutes conduct detrimental to the best interests of the League or professional football.
"*8.5 The Commissioner shall interpret and from time to time establish
policy and procedure in respect to the provisions of the Constitution and
By-Laws and any enforcement thereof.
"8.13 (A) Whenever the Commissioner, after notice and hearing, de-

cides that an owner, shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a member club, or any player, coach, officer, director or employee thereof, or an
officer, employee or official of the League has either violated the Constitution or By-Laws of the League, or has been or is guilty of conduct detrimental
to the welfare of the League or professional football, then the Commissioner
shall have complete authority to:

(1) Suspend and/or fine such person in an amount not in excess
of five thousand dollars ($5,000), and/or
(2) Cancel any contract or agreement of such person with the
League or with any member thereof.
(F) The Commissioner shall have the power, without a hearing, to dis-

approve contracts between a player and a club, if such a contract has been
executed in violation of or contrary to the Constitution and By-laws of the
League, or, if either or both of the parties to such contract have been or
are guilty of an act or conduct which is or may be detrimental to the League

or to the sport of professional football ....
Id. at 13-14.
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tract as a condition of his continued eligibility to play football for
the Patriots or any other NFL club. Kapp brought suit declaring that
the draft rule, tampering rule, option clause and Rozelle rule incorporated in the Standard Player Contract were part of a combination and
conspiracy by the NFL team owners to restrict competition for players' services in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 10 Upon the court's suggestion, Kapp made a motion for
summary judgement. The court held that the draft rule, tampering
rule, Rozelle rule and comparable provisions of the Standard Player
Contract (insofar as it was used to enforce the above rules and the
"one-man rule"") were so patently unreasonable as to violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Summary judgement was not granted on the
claim relating to the option clause because it could not be said to so
extend the original term of employment and salary as to be patently
2
unreasonable.'
10. Section one of the statute provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . ..."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section two provides in relevant part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .
I..." § 2.
Id.
11. See materials cited note 9 supra.
12. Kapp v. National Football League, Civil No. 72-537 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 20,
1974) [hereinafter cited as instant case]. Judge Sweigert denied the NFL the right to
seek an immediate appeal of the decision in the instant case. In an order issued on
January 31, 1975, Judge Sweigert stated that the NFL must postpone their appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit until after the outcome of
the trial, scheduled to begin May 19, 1975, which will determine the damages owed
to Kapp. Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 31, 1975, at 27, col. 7.
On April 11, 1975, Judge Sweigert modified his memorandum for summary judgement by vacating it insofar as it concluded that the issue of the reasonableness of the
Rozelle rule, draft rule, tampering rule, and "one-man rule" was a matter of law. Kapp
v. National Football League, Civil No. 72-537 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 11, 1975). Under this
order the jury will determine as an issue of fact whether these NFL rules are so unreasonable as to violate the antitrust laws. The reason for the modification was that
Judge Sweigert had "in mind the possibility that a reviewing court might hold that,
although the application of the 'rule of reason' [rather than the 'per se rule'] is proper,
the issue of reasonableness should be tried as an issue of fact [rather than concluded
as a matter of law]. If the reviewing court should so hold, it would routinely send
the case back to this court for further proceedings on that issue without any decision on
the merits." Id. It therefore appears that Judge Sweigert still strongly believes that
these specific NFL rules are so clearly unreasonable as to violate the antitrust laws, and
modified his memorandum for summary judgement only to prevent the case from being
remanded to the trial court on "procedural, technical ground[s]." Id. In his order, Judge
Sweigert stated that he "reserv[ed] ... power to make such post-trial rulings, including
reinstatement of [his] previous ruling, as the record may then require." Id. The implication of this statement may be that should the jury find the Rozelle rule, draft rule,

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
I. PRIOR APPLICATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

Professional football, unlike professional baseball,' 3 does not
enjoy a special exemption protecting it from the federal antitrust
laws. This was conclusively decided in Radovich v. National Football
League,14 which held that the volume of interstate business involved
in organized professional football placed it within the provisions of
the antitrust law.1 Even after the Radovich decision, however, most
courts were reluctant to apply the antitrust laws to professional sports,
particularly professional football.

In Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,' a professional
football player challenged the validity of the option clause on the
ground that it violated the antitrust laws. In summarily dismissing
this contention, the court stated that the contract was not "so unreasonable and harsh as to be unenforceable in equity."' 7 The decision came
two years before the adoption of the Rozelle rule which in conjunction with the option clause makes the Standard Player Contract a
much harsher and more unreasonable contract.
tampering rule, and "one-man rule" not so unreasonable as to violate the antitrust laws,
Judge Sweigert would grant Kapp a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under rule
50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Comment attempts to show the
fact that the NFL has committed per se violations of the antitrust laws, thereby necessitating a conclusion as a matter of law that antitrust violations occurred. This author
believes Judge Sweigert was unnecessarily cautious, and that his order partially vacating
his memorandum for summary judgement by allowing the jury to decide the reasonableness of the various NFL rules was unwarranted.
13. In Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), it was
held that the business of professional baseball was not interstate commerce and not
subject to the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1933), implicity recognized that professional baseball was interstate commerce but held, "that the business of providing public baseball games for
profit between clubs of professional baseball players, was not within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws ....

."

Id. at 357. It was not until the decision in Flood v. Kuhn,

407 U.S. 258 (1972), that the Court explicity stated that: "Professional baseball is a
business and it is engaged in interstate commerce." Id. at 282. Although recognizing
this fact, the Court upheld all prior decisions by concluding that: "With its reserve
system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exemption and an anomaly." Id.
14. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
15. The Court noted that the Toolson decision strictly limited antitrust exemption
to baseball and that the Federal Baseball decision, "could not be relied upon as a basis
of exemption for other segments of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise ...

." Id.

at 451.

16. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). See also Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. 348 S.W.2d at 47.
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The combined rules virtually destroy the market in which a
player can sell his services. It is the intimidating effect which the
Rozelle rule has on the owners of the teams which results in the lack
of competition for players' services. This result may be illustrated by
one instance of the rule's use. The Commissioner exercised his rights
under the option clause for the first time when the New Orleans Saints
of the NFL negotiated a contract with David Parks, who had played
out his option with the San Francisco 49ers. Commissioner Rozelle
awarded the Saint's first draft choice of that year as well as the first
draft choice in the succeeding year' to the 49ers as compensation for
"losing" a player who was no longer under contract. By this action,
the "commissioner was warning all clubs that they would pay an unreasonable price for the services of a player who had played out
his option."'19
The impact of the Rozelle rule is to prevent other clubs from
competing for the services of a player who has played out his option.
The result is "price fixing": players' salaries remain at a level artificially lower than that which would result if free competition were
allowed.
In Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett2 0 the court upheld professional basketball's option clause 21 under the interpretation
that after a club's one year option on a player's services is concluded,
the player can sign with any other team.22 The court's reasoning was
that "[p]rofessional . . . basketball require[s] regulations for the protection of the business . . . and so long as they are fair and reason18. Comment, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. Rv.
459, 464 (1970).
19. Id. at 464.
20. 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 Cayahoga County Ct. of C.P., 1961).
21. As it appeared in Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 981
(M.D.N.C. 1969) the National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract provided:
On or before September 1 next following the last playing season covered
by this contract and renewals and extensions thereof, the Club may tender to
the Player a contract for the next succeeding season by mailing the same to
the Player at his address last known to the Club. If the Player fails, neglects
or omits to sign and return such contract to the Club so that the Club
receives it on or before October 1st next succeeding, then this contract shall
be deemed renewed and extended for the period of one year, upon the same
terms and conditions in all aspects as are provided herein ....
22. This reading of the option clause was reaffirmed in Lemat Corp. v. Barry,
275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969).
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able there is no violation of the laws on restraint of trade." 23 It
appears from this case that the reason professional basketball's option
clause is "fair and reasonable" is that it does not contain a clause
analogous to professional football's Rozelle rule. When a professional
basketball player plays out his option year, there is no intimidating
effect upon the other franchise owners to prevent them from bidding
for the player's services. As a result, the player's salary is commensurate
with his worth in the marketplace. It would appear that an artificial
barrier which prevents a player from selling his services for their fair
market value would not meet the standards of the "fair and reasonable" test.
Hockey's reserve clause 24 was upheld in Nassau Sports v. Peters,25
in which Judge Neaher stated that the defendant did not demonstrate prima fade illegality under the antitrust laws. The defendant,
Gary Peters, was under contract with the Boston Bruins of the National Hockey League for the 1972-73 season, his contract terminating on September 30, 1972. An expansion team of the National
Hockey League, the New York Islanders, acquired the contract rights
to Peters from the Bruins. As a result of a disagreement in salary
negotiations, Peters signed a contract with the New York Raiders of
the competing World Hockey League. The Islanders sought to enforce the "reserve clause" in their contract with Peters through an injunction preventing him from playing with the Raiders. Judge Neaher
granted the injunction, stating that "the unique character of the
business ...

and the need for some form of protective system to insure

the recoupment of investments-often large-made both to develop
and acquire talented players," 26 calls for the use of some form of reserve clause. The effect of hockey's reserve clause is to perpetually
bind a player to the team to which he is under contract. This prevents a player from selling his services on the open market. The team
with his rights has "price-fixing" power with regard to his salary.
"Price fixing" is a per se violation of the antitrust laws: the courts are
23. 19 Ohio Op. 2d at 140, 181 N.E.2d at 517.
24. As it appeared in Philadelphia World Hockey Co. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Co., 351 F. Supp. 462, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the reserve clause states: "The player
hereby undertakes that he will at the request of the club enter into a contract for the
following playing season upon the same terms and conditions as this contract save as
to salary which shall be determined by mutual agreement ....
25. 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
26. Id. at 879.
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precluded from entertaining any justification for its existence. 27 Therefore, Judge Neaher erred by not subjecting hockey's reserve clause
to the antitrust laws simply on the basis that hockey was a unique
business with unique problems. It appears that Philadelphia World
Hockey Club v. PhiladelphiaHockey Club,28 in which a player still
under contract, via the reserve clause, to a team in the National
Hockey League, was granted a temporary injunction preventing enforcement of the reserve clause, should be the controlling law in
this area. 29 Judge Higgenbotham concluded that "[t]here is a clear
and substantial likelihood that at trial . . .the reserve clause in the

Standard Players Contract... will be found to have given the NHL
the power of monopoly in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. ' 30
Since there is a "clear and substantial likelihood" that the National Hockey League's reserve clause is a violation of section two of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, it is possible that the NFL's option clause
also violates section two of the Act. Nassau implies that a court which
were to reject the notion that the National Hockey League's reserve
clause results in a per se violation of the antitrust laws, and apply instead the rule of reason, may conclude that the clause is necessary to
protect each team's large investment in developing the players by
bringing them through an elaborate system of farm teams. If the
rule of reason were applied to determine whether professional footballs' option clause and Rozelle rule are necessary, a decision similar
to that of Nassau should not result. This is because professional football relies on the colleges to develop the abilities of each player. A
professional NFL team makes no investment whatsoever in a player
before he becomes a member of the team. Therefore, there would
appear to be no financial loss when a team loses a player because it
refused to pay him a salary commensurate with his fair market value.
The trend in recent sports decisions, as Philadelphiapoints out,
has been a willingness on the part of the courts to impose the sanctions
of the antitrust laws on professional sport leagues. In Haywood v. Na27. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
28. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n
v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D.C. Mass. 1972).
29. The court in Nassau Sports was not bound by the decision in Philadelphiabecause Judge Higginbotham expressly excluded the case-which was then sub judicefrom the scope of his ruling. 352 F. Supp. at 881.
30. 351 F. Supp. at 518.
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tional Basketball Association 3 1 Justice Douglas reinstated an injunction which had prevented any interference with allowing Spencer
Haywood to play for the Seattle Supersonics of the National Basketball Association. Under the league rules, a college player could not be
2
drafted until four years after he had graduated from high school.3
Haywood alleged that the effect of this provision was a group boycott
on the part of the National Basketball Association against himself
and other qualified players who were in a similar situation.
At the district court level, Judge Ferguson had recognized that
basketball was subject to the antitrust laws and that practices per se
illegal for other businesses were per se illegal for the National Basketball Association. 33 The cases of Kapp and Haywood are similar in
that the league commissioner had invalidated a contract between each
prospective plaintiff and his employer on the ground that the league's
constitution and bylaws prohibited a certain segment of potential
athletes from the market. In language equally fitting the Kapp case,
the district court stated that the application of the rule
constitutes a "primary" concerted refusal to deal wherein the actors at
one level of a trade pattern (NBA team members) refuse to deal with
an actor at another level (those ineligible under the NBA's four year
college rule).
The harm resulting from a "primary" boycott such as this is threefold. First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded
from the market he seeks to enter. Second, competition in the market
in which the victim attempts to sell his services is injured. Third,
by pooling their economic power, the individual members of the
NBA have, in effect, established their own private government. Of
31. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
32. The National Basketball Association Bylaws § 2.05 provided:
A person who has not completed high school or who has completed
high school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or
to be a Player [in the NBA] until four years after he has been graduated or
four years after his original high school class has been graduated, as the case
may be, nor may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college
but is no longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player
until the time when he would have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotiations or agreements with any such person during
such period shall be null and void and shall confer no rights to the services
of such person any time thereafter.
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
33. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971).

ANTITRUST LAW

course, this is true only where the members of the combination possess

market power in a degree approaching
a shared monopoly. This is
34
uncontested in the present case.
The courts appear willing to find violations of the antitrust laws
in sports whenever a "boycott" is found to exist, regardless of the
reason for its existence. An example of this judicial response may be
found in Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association.3 5 Plaintiff

Blalock was observed illegally moving her ball during a Ladies Professional Golf Association Tournament. A meeting of the executive

board of the association resulted in a one year's suspension from the
tour as Blalock's punishment for cheating. The court found that the
purpose and effect of the arrangement . . . was to exclude Blalock
from the market and is therefore a "naked restraint of trade." Plaintiff is a member in good standing of defendant L.P.G.A. and suspension therefrom is tantamount to total exclusion from the market of
professional golf.36
The implicit holding of this case is that when a per se violation of
the antitrust law is found in professional sports, the court need not
inquire as to the reasonableness of the restraint. If there exists a situation where the rule of reason should have been applied to a boycott,
Blalock, dealing with a suspension by a professional association of
one of its members for cheating, so that the integrity of the association would not be tarnished, is such a case.3 7 The court, granting
Blalock's motion for summary judgement, ruled to the contrary.
The preceding cases illustrate the current trend of authority in
professional sports decisions to find per se violations of the antitrust
34. Id. at 1061.
35. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Also of note is Washington State Bowling Proprietor Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 963 (1966), in which defendants conducted bowling tournaments open only to
persons who agreed to restrict their leagues and tournament bowling to members of
certain associations. In holding the eligibility rules to be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, the court stated: "Even assuming that abuses in the sport existed, it has
been established since the case of Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal
Trade Commission . . . that such circumstances do not justify a private association
passing regulations to deal with the problem when their effect is to restrain or regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 376.
36. 359 F. Supp. at 1265.
37. Contra, Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). This is one of the rare cases in which the court applied the rule of reason to
a boycott.
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laws whenever a group boycott exists. Therefore, Judge Sweigert had
ample precedent in these decisions alone to grant Joe Kapp's motion
for summary judgement on the basis of a per se violation.

II. THE CONCERTED ACTIONS BY THE NFL AGAINST KAPP
RESULTED IN PER SE VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAW

In light of the judicial trend in favor of vigorously applying the
antitrust laws to professional sports, Judge Sweigert's decision should
not surprise anyone.38 The only real issue Judge Sweigert had to decide was whether to apply the per se rules3 9 or the rule of reason4 0 to
hold that the draft rule, tampering rule, and Rozelle rule violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act. Judge Sweigert erred in applying the rule
of reason because, under basic principles of antitrust law, there can
be no doubt per se violations occurred.
A. Group Boycott
Commissioner Rozelle's decision barring Kapp from playing football, pursuant to his contract with the New England Patriots, or with
any other NFL club, constituted a group boycott. It is an established
principle that:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They
38. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F.
Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

39. Certain violations of the antitrust laws such as group boycotts, price fixing
and tying arrangements are classified as "illegal per se." The law regards these restraints as so inherently anticompetitive that they are struck down without consideration of underlying motives, purposes or effects. See Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
40. The "rule of reason" is invoked when the restraints on trade and commerce
have a tendency to suppress competition but may also have certain redeeming features which, under appropriate circumstances, save them from condemnation. However,

even where the rule of reason applies, the concerted conduct sought to be immunized
from the antitrust law must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its legitimate goals. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947);
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
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have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in
the specific circumstances .... 41
The extreme limits to which this principle is applied is expresled in
Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC.- The facts in this case were that
a group of original designers and manufacturers, who were members
of a guild, refused to sell their creations to "style pirates." The court
held this refusal to deal (group boycott) illegal per se, even though
the reason for the boycott was the goal of preventing retailers from
dealing with manufacturers of the copies and thereby eliminating
"style piracy," which is itself tortious conduct. The court stated that
"the reasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination to
accomplish its unlawful object [group boycott] is no more material
than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by unlawful combination." 43 Group boycotts which have as their aim the prevention
of injurious illegal activity have been declared to be illegal per se.
There appears to be no reason why a group boycott whose purpose
was to promote antitrust violations by requiring all players to sign
the Standard Player Contract should not have similarly been held
to be illegal per se in the instant case.
B. Price Fixing
The draft rule, tampering rule, and Rozelle rule all have one characteristic in common, they lead to "price fixing" of players' salaries
at a level artificially lower than that which would exist if the NFL
had not created these artificial barriers. The effect of the draft rule
is that a player who is unwilling to accept the salary terms of the
team which drafted him is denied the opportunity to play professional
football in the United States. The reason is that the drafting team
has exclusive rights to the player and no other team is allowed to employ, negotiate or deal with him," notwithstanding the fact that another team, which recognizes that player's value, would be willing
to pay him a larger salary than that offered by the team drafting him.
41. KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
42. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
43. Id. at 468.
44. This holds true unless the team drafting the player trades their "rights" to
that player to another team. When this occurs, the player must negotiate with the
team purchasing his "rights" to the exclusion of all other teams in the NFL.
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This is a strong economic and psychological factor to induce a player
to sign with the team that drafted him at the salary fixed by that
team.

45

Once a player signs with the team owning his rights, the tampering rules prevent any other team from approaching the player to inform him that they would be interested in obtaining his services when
his current contract expires. The effect of this rule is that it not
only prevents a player from knowing that other teams are interested
in acquiring his services, but also prevents competing teams -from
bidding for his services. Upon the expiration of a player's contract,
the option clause serves as a further deterrent to prevent him from
becoming a free agent46 because the player would rather sign a new
contract with his team at the new salary offered him, than play
an additional year at a 10 percent reduction in salary. Once a player
becomes a free agent, the Rozelle rule is the final step in the NFL
conspiracy to prevent competitive bidding for players' services (thus
fixing compensation at lower salaries than would otherwise exist). The
effect of this rule is that it prevents other teams from bidding for the
free agent's services out of fear of losing an established player or draft
choice from their own team. This intimidating effect on the other
clubs generally forces the free agent to sign with his old team at the
salary fixed by them since the market for his services among the
other teams has been destroyed.
45. The player has the option of going to Canada and playing in the Canadian
Football League. It should be noted that this is not always an alternative, since the
bylaws of the Canadian league set a quota restricting the number of American players
on each team. The current season, 1974-75, saw the establishment of the World Football League in the United States. This league lost $20 million in its first season, and
the majority of players did not receive their salaries. There remains strong doubt
whether this league will survive and provide an alternative to players wanting to play
football in the United States. Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 4, 1975, § B, at 3, col. 5.
46. A "free agent" is a player who has played out his option year and is free
to sign with any time that wants him, subject, of course, to the Rozelle rule. The effect
of allowing a player to become a "free agent" (absent a rule similar to the Rozelle rule)
and allowing competitive bidding was highlighted by the recent situation involving Jim
"Catfish" Hunter. On December 16, 1974, an arbitration panel declared Hunter a
free agent eligible to sign with-any professional baseball team. This was the first time
in professional baseball history that an established player became a free agent. (Baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws, and as a result has a reserve clause which
forever binds a player to the team owning his righfs, effectively preventing any competitive bidding for player services.) After only 15 days of free agent status, Hunter
signed a five year contract with the New York Yankees for $3.75 million. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 5. This was quite an increase over the $100,000 yearly salary
which he had received as a result of the artificial barrier of the reserve clause.
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United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 47 held that agreements

to fix prices are illegal per se under the Sherman Act. In this case,
numerous oil companies and individuals conspired to raise and maintain spot prices of gasoline by buying up "distress" gasoline on the
spot market, thereby eliminating it as a market factor. The court
held this price fixing to be a per se violation even though competition was not entirely eliminated from the market, but merely curtailed. This rationale destroys any defense of the NFL that the combination of the draft rule, tampering rule and Rozelle rule merely curtails competition without totally eliminating it. The court in Socony
went on to state, "[t]he elimination of so called competitive evils is
no legal justification .... ,48 However, this is the exact defense that the
NFL asserted and which Judge Sweigert accepted, to take the NFL's
price-fixing arrangements out of the per se illegal category. The NFL
argued that league sports activities are so unique that "although club
teams compete on the playing field, the clubs are not, and indeed
cannot be, competitors with one another in a business way because
the very purpose of a professional sports league is to provide reasonably matched teams for field competition to attract and sustain the
interest and patronage of the fans." 49 They contended that if member
clubs were allowed by the league to engage in competitive bidding
for players' services, the most strongly financed clubs would monopolize the best or better players, leaving only average players for the
other clubs, and destroying evenly matched field competition." This
argument cannot stand on its own merits because, if competitive bidding for players' services were allowed, the salary of the players would
be extraordinarily high. This fact would make it almost impossible
for a few teams to afford signing all the stars at the new competitive
salaries. If the NFL is correct in its conclusion that "evenly matched
field competition brings fans to the games," 51 this fact would serve as
a deterrent to team owners of financially successful clubs from at47. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
48. 310 U.S. at 220.
49. Instant case at 9.
50. There remains a question just how evenly matched the teams are on the
playing field. Teams such as the Miami Dolphins, Minnesota Vikings, Los Angeles
Rams, Dallas Cowboys and Oakland Raiders are continually in the playoffs, despite
whatever effect the Rozelle rule and other provisions may have.
51. Instant case at 10.
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tempting to sign all the stars, even if this were economically possible. The owners would realize that they would not be able to recoup
their investment in players' salaries via large attendance throughout
the league due to the fact that the fans would not come out to see unevenly matched field competition. The team owners, being businessmen, would realize it is in their self-interest to maintain a competitive
league and would bid for players' services accordingly. However, the
question of whether the draft rule, tampering rule, and Rozelle rule
are beneficial or necessary to promote the interests of professional football was not relevant in the Kapp case, for as the court in Socony
stated:
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not
particular price fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive .... [T]he Sherman Act, so far as price fixing agreements are
concerned,
establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries
52
alike.

This uniform rule is that price fixing is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
C. Tie-in Contract
An argument can be made, although not as cogently as can the
"group boycott" and "price-fixing" arguments that the NFL and franchise owners have entered into an illegal tie-in contract. The NFL
may be viewed as a seller of a tying product, the right to use the
NFL trademark on the purchased franchise. The buyer of this product
must also acquire a "tied product," football players' services, only from
the NFL pursuant to its constitution and bylaws. The NFL Constitution and Bylaws contain the draft rule, tampering rules, option clause
and Rozelle rule. In combination, these provisions result in each
franchise owner being denied the right to compete for players' services.5 3 Therefore, the tie-in clause, requiring the purchasers of franchises to obtain players' services pursuant to the NFL Constitution
and Bylaws, results in players, who have not signed a Standard Player
Contract, being precluded from supplying their services to a competitive market.
52. 310 U.S. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
53. See notes 41-52 supra & accompanying text.
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Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States54 defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from
any other supplier."55 The NFL may argue that two distinct products
are not involved for the reason that the various rules involved are
essential components of the franchise system and are not a distinct
product from the franchise itself. This argument has been attempted
in many franchise sales in which an illegal tie-in contract was found
to exist. The contention has failed in every case. For instance, in
Seigel v. Chicken Delight56 the court held that a license to use a
trademark was a tying item in the traditional sense. 57 That case involved a standard form franchise agreement which required the franchisee to purchase certain cooking equipment and dry mix food items
from defendant Chicken Delight as a condition of obtaining defendant's trademark license to operate home delivery and pickup food
stores. Chicken Delight, in trying to take its agreement out of the
tie-in category, argued that there was only one product; the equipment and dry food mix items were not separate products but essential
components of the franchise system. The court rejected the argument
that there was only one product.
The historical conception of a trade-mark as a strict emblem of source
of the product to which it attaches has largely been abandoned. The
burgeoning business of franchising has made trade-mark licensing a
widespread commercial practice and has resulted in the development
of a new rationale for trade-marks as representations of product
quality. This is particularly true in the case of a franchise system
set up not to distribute trade-marked goods of the franchisor, but,
as here, to conduct a certain business under a common trade-mark or
trade-name. Under such a type of franchise, the trade-mark simply
reflects the goodwill and quality standards of the enterprise which it
identifies. As long as the system of operation of the franchisees lives
up to those quality standards and remains as represented by the mark
so that the public is not misled, neither the protection afforded the
54. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
55. Id. at 5-6.
56. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See also
Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v. Bratwursthaus Management Corp., 354 F. Supp.
1237 (E.D. Va. 1973).
57. The court's decision to regard a trademark as a distinct tying item is not
without precedent. See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
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trade-mark by law nor the value of the trade-mark to the licensee de-

pends upon the source of the components. 5

Thus, as the equipment and mixes in Seigel were not required to be
bought from defendant franchisor, neither is it necessary for a football team, in order to maintain the high caliber of the franchisor's
trademark, to purchase a players' services from the NFL pursuant to
its constitution and bylaws.
The requirement of Northern Pacific that there be two distinct
products is met. However, even if the NFL could persuade the
court that there was only one product, the alternative requirement
of Northern Pacific remains in that the buyers (franchisees) are promising that they will not buy a player's services from anyone except
the NFL pursuant to its constitution and bylaws. The effect of this
promise gives rise to the following precise problems, resulting in tying
arrangements which are of antitrust concern:
1) tying clauses may destroy the free access of competing suppliers
of the tied product to the consuming market;r 9 and

2) they may force buyers
into giving up purchase of substitutes
60
for the tied product.
In the instant case, the buyers or team owners are precluded from
purchasing the services of Joe Kapp because he has refused to sign a
Standard Player Contract. Thus, in the instant case, Joe Kapp may be
regarded as a substitute for the "tied product," that is, those players
who have signed a Standard Player Contract. Furthermore, those
football players who have not signed a Standard Player Contract may
be regarded as competing with the NFL to supply owners with their
services. The NFL supplies only those players who have signed a
Standard Player Contract, which in effect assigns all of the players'
rights to the NFL. Therefore, those football players who have not
signed an NFL contract are prevented from selling their services to
team owners since owners must purchase players' services only from
the NFL.
Once it is established that a tie-in contract exists, in order for
58. 448 F.2d at 48-49.
59. International Salt Co. Ot.United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
60. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
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this arrangement to be a violation of section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, both of the following conditions must be met: (1) The
tying product must possess sufficient "economic power" to appreciably
restrain competition in the tied product market; 61 and (2) a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product must be re62
strained.
The National Football League was the only professional football
league in the United States until the 1974-75 season. During this
season, the World Football League began play and ended the season
with a $20 million loss. 63 There currently remains doubt whether the

World Football League will survive. Even if it does, the existence of
the World Football League cannot be said to destroy the monopoly
position of the NFL. The NFL's monopoly position can readily be
ascertained by the extraordinary high price it commands when it sells
a new franchise. In March, 1974, it awarded franchises to groups
from Seattle and Tampa for the price of $16 million each. 64
If the argument that the advent of the World Football League
no longer leaves the NFL in a monopolistic position succeeds, thereby
giving rise to the inference that the NFL does not have sufficient "economic power" with regard to the tying product, 65 United States v.
Loew's, Inc.66 states:

Market dominance-some power to control price and to exclude
competition-is by no means the only test of whether the seller has
The requisite economic power
the requisite economic power ....
is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted .... 67
61. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See also Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
62. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
63. See note 45 supra.
64. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1974, at 58, col. 1.
65. This inference is highly unlikely because the test of "economic power" has been
interpreted quite liberally by the courts. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969), the Court stated that:
The standard of "sufficient economic power" does not as the district court held,
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position
throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made
unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can be
sufficient even though the power falls short of dominance and even though
the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market.
66. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
67. Id. at 45. See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
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The term "National Football League" and its insignia are registered
trademarks.68 When purchasing an NFL franchise the owner is buying
the right to use the trademark which is an assurance to fans that when
they come to the stadium they will see professional football played
at its best. The question arises whether a trademark used as a tying
product enjoys the same presumption of economic power as a patented
or copyrighted product. In Seigel v. Chicken Delight, it was held that
the fact that a trademark was the tying product was sufficient evidence
that the tying product possessed economic power to appreciably restrain free competition in the tied product markets. 60 The court noted:
Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering
the distinctive product on the market, so the registered trade-mark
presents a legal barrier against competition. It is not the nature of
the public interest that has caused the legal barrier to be erected that
is the basis for the presumption, but the fact that such a barrier does
70

exist.

Since it can hardly be denied that the NFL trademark is distinctive,
or that it possesses goodwill and public acceptance unique to it and
not enjoyed by other football leagues, there can be no doubt that the
test of "economic power" is met.
The constitution and bylaws of the NFL state that: "All contracts between clubs and players shall ... be in the form accepted by
the member clubs of the league; such contract shall be known as the
'Standard Player Contract.' "71 The Commissioner of the NFL is allowed to disapprove contracts between a player and a club if the
player does not sign the Standard Player Contract. 72 Since all the
players are coerced into signing this contract in order to be eligible
to play professional football, which is virtually coterminous with playing in the NFL, not merely a substantial amount of the tied product
(football players), is restrained from the free market, but practically
all of it.
68. N.F.L. & Shield Design, Trademark No. 841-001 (Class No. 100, Dec. 19,
1967).
69. 448 F.2d at 50. See also Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v. Bratwursthaus
Management Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1237 (E.D. Va. 1973).
70. 448 F.2d at 50.
71. Brief 19; see material cited note 6 supra.
72. See material cited, note 9 supra.
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A tie-in contract is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.7 3
This means that tying arrangements, once found to exist in a context of sufficient economic power, are illegal "without elaborate inquiry as to . . . the business excuse for their use." 74 Therefore the
NFL cannot make any arguments that professional football is a peculiar
industry that requires this particular tie-in contract to keep the league
and its teams competitive. It certainly cannot be denied that the NFL
as a whole and each individual team owner benefits from the existence
of the tie-in contract. This is so because each individual player or supplier is denied the right to sell his services in a free and open marketplace. As a result the salary paid by each team is lower than that which
would result if competitive bidding were allowed to prevail. Thereby,
a major operating expense of the team is lowered, increasing each
owner's profits. There is nothing wrong with trying to decrease expenses and increase profits, but as Anderson v. Shipowners Association 75 states: "a restraint of interstate commerce cannot be justified
by the fact that the object of the participants in the combination was
to benefit themselves in a way which might have been unobjectionable
' 76
in the absence of some restraint.
The team owners, although they have standing to sue under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, will fail to do so because they are benefiting
from the tie-in clause. Inevitably, the burden of rectifying the wrong
committed will fall on the shoulders of the injured party, the foot77
ball players, who are the suppliers of a restrained product.
Anderson is a case which on its facts is very similar to the instant
case. In Anderson the Supreme Court held that where members of an
association completely surrender their freedom of action in respect
of the employment of seamen to the association, section one of the
Sherman Antitrust Act is violated. In deciding the case, the Court did
not use one of the per se labels to pinpoint the exact violation, but
rather decided generally that a violation of the antitrust law occurred.
There can be no doubt that the court recognized the existence of a
73. See United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v.

United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
74. United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1962).
75. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
76. Id. at 363.
77. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), held that a
football player injured in his trade or business has standing to sue under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
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per se violation, however, for it explicitly rejected the application of
the rule of reason when it stated that "[i]t is not important ...

to in-

quire whether, as contended by respondents, the object of the combination was merely to regulate the employment of men and not to
restrain commerce.17 8 It is submitted that what the Court saw as a

per se violation of the antitrust laws was a tie-in contract similar to
that which exists in the instant case.
Briefly the facts of Anderson were that a seaman was denied employment because he failed to comply with the requirements of the
defendant association. The association was comprised of members
which engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. One of the prerequisites to obtaining a membership franchise was the relinquishment
to the association of each vessel owner's right to employ seamen. As
the court stated, "each of the shipowners and operators, by entering
into this combination, has, in respect of employment of seamen, surrendered himself completely to the control of the associations." 70
The association may be characterized as a seller and the owners
of merchant vessels as buyers. The owners of merchant vessels bought
the "tying" product, consisting of membership in the association and
all the benefits such membership entails. Like Joe Kapp, the seaman is
the "tied" product in that his employers must sign an agreement that
they will purchase his services only from the association. Similarly, the
seaman can instead act as a competing supplier by terminating his
association registration and offering his services as an independent.
In Anderson, as in the instant case, there existed a situation where the
buyers benefited by the tie-in clause in that members of the association were prevented from competing with one another for the services
of the seamen, thus causing salaries to remain at an artificially lower
level than would exist otherwise. The seamen, as competing suppliers,
were prevented from selling their services in a free market.
In Anderson the prerequisite of both Northern and Times was
met, making the tie-in contract a per se violation of the antitrust law.
First, there was no doubt that the seller association had sufficient economic power in the market for the "tying" product, for as the case
states: "The members of respondent Association own, operate and
control substantially all the merchant vessels of American Registry
78. 272 U.S. at 363.
79. Id. at 362.
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engaged in interstate and foreign commerce among the ports of the
Pacific Coast and with foreign countries." 80 Thus, any merchant
vessel wishing to acquire the many benefits membership in such an
association would bestow, would be forced to purchase a membership
in it. Secondly, since any seamen wishing employment had to register
with the association, the majority did so, thus creating a "substantial"
restraint on the tied product.
Anderson, therefore, represents possible authority for the proposition that a tied product, by failing to comply with registration requirements, may become a competing seller with standing to sue under
section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Joe Kapp was in a position
similar to that of the seamen in Anderson: Judge Sweigert could have
considered the possibility that a per se violation of section one of the
Sherman Antitrust Act occurred by applying the tie-in clause principles
to the instant case.
III.

RATIONALE OF OPINION

Regardless of the fact that per se violations occurred and that
other courts have applied the per se rules to professional sports,"' Judge
Sweigert rested his decision on the rule of reason. 2 He did so because
he recognized the unique nature and purpose of sports league activities,
which he thought required joint agreements to assure continued
functioning of the leagues. However, this reasoning is contrary to
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.18s which held that promotion
of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize
otherwise illegal conduct. The court stated that it is only if conduct
is not unlawful in its impact on the marketplace, or if self-interest
coincides with the preservation and promotion of competition, that
protection is achieved. Clearly, maintaining the players' salaries at
80. Id. at 361.
81. See Washington State Bowling Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th
Cir.* 1966); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).

82. Judge Sweigert was aware that the per se test might well be appropriate in
the instant case. He stated that "we are mindful that it may be held on review that
application of the per se test renders N.F.L. enforcement illegal as to all restrictive
employment or tenure rules regardless of reasonableness for sports league purposes."
Instant case at 18.

83. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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artificially low levels via the draft rule, tampering rule and Rozelle
rule wa in the NFL's self-interest. Like all businessmen, the NFL
owners wanted to keep expenses low in order to achieve higher profit
margins. However, these rules resulted in price fixing. Thus, the per
se rule, rather than the rule of reason, should have been applied to
professional football as it is to all other businesses. Congress meant
the Sherman Antitrust Act to apply to "every contract, combination
.. . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . . ,4Nowhere within this law is professional football

given an exemption or special privileges because of its "unique nature."8' 5 Therefore, those acts which are per se violations in other
businesses must be per se violations in professional football. It is up
to Congress to recognize football as a unique business and grant it
special consideration, that is, use of the rule of reason when the per se
test would otherwise be applicable. The Radovich court recognized
this when it stated that
the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be,
is by legislation and not court decision. Congressional processes are
more acccommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an
opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation."0
Therefore, any injustice that might result from using the per se rule,
rather than the more liberal rule of reason, must be cured by Congress, not the courts. Congress acted in the past where it saw fit to
exempt certain actions by professional football from the antitrust
laws.8 7 Lack of congressional action in exempting the NFL Constitu84. 15 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1970).
85. This was recognized by judicial interpretation in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1971).
86. Id. at 452.
87. The decision in United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Pa. 1953), put the NFL on notice that they would need congressional authority
before engaging in any activity which violated the antitrust law. This decision held that
the section of the NFL bylaws giving the Commissioner power to prevent all radio
and television broadcasts of football games, by disapproving contracts for the sale of

radio and television rights, gave an employee of the league unlimited and arbitrary
power to enforce illegal territorial restrictions. This decision set the stage for the enactment in 1961 of 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), which allows professional sports leagues
to pool certain of their television rights and sell them as a package without incurring
antitrust liability. In 1966 Congress amended the 1961 statute, so as to permit a joinder
of the NFL and American Football League. Without this enabling legislation, the merger

would have constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade under the antitrust
laws.
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tion and Bylaws, which include the draft rule, tampering rule and
Rozelle rule, must be interpreted as indicative of congressional intent
that the full force of the antitrust laws be applied to these provisions. 88
Evidence of this can be seen by the statement of the House Judiciary
Committee when it was hearing debate on whether to give professional
football an exemption from the antitrust laws for the specific purpose
of allowing the NFL and American Football League to merge. The
Committee stated:
The proposed bill would not extend to the combined league any
greater antitrust immunity than that now existing for the existing
professional leagues. The proposed legislation does not seek to resolve
any of the antitrust problems of professional football or the other
professional team sports.
It is the intent of the committee that the new league will commence operations with no greater antitrust immunity than the existing individual league now enjoys. The sole effect of this legislation is
to permit the combination89 of the two leagues to go forward without
fear of antitrust challenge.
Commissioner Rozelle testified that the merger bill "would not give
the expanded league any greater antitrust immunity than that which
other single-league professional sports . . . now have" and that "[a]ll
other applications of the antitrust laws to professional sports... would
remain as they are."'9 0 When asked by the chairman of the Committee
whether he wished the antitrust exemptions to apply to the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws, Commissioner Rozelle answered: "No, Mr.
Chairman." 91
Judge Sweigert applied the rule of reason because he deemed
suits brought by player-employees against sports league club owners
to be different from the more typical antitrust suits. Judge Sweigert
stated that in the instant case the only alleged anticompetitive practice was joint club enforcement, through the league, "whenever the
player agrees to accept and the clubs agree among themselves to enforce certain restrictions on the player's right to freely pursue his
88. This view was expressed in legislation introduced by Senator Irwin in 1971,
which would have applied explicitly the Sherman Act to professional sports. S. 2616,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
89. Hearings on S. 3817 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
the judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1966).
90. Id. at 32.
91. Id. at 42.
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trade with other club employers and the clubs yield to that extent
their free choice to employ."9 2 The Supreme Court's holding in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States9 3 should be the applicable
law. In this case it was stated that there was no "support in reason or
authority for the proposition that agreements between legally separate
persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and
others can be justified by labeling the project a 'joint venture.' ",04
Judge Sweigert, rather than following the holding of Timken, relied
on the rule of contract law that employer-employee contracts, restricting an employee's right to freely pursue his trade, may be illegal as
against public policy if, but only if, the restraint is unreasonable. 5
In effect, however, the Court in Timken held, that once an agreement
comes out of the realm of employer-employee contract negotiations
and into the realm of the antitrust laws (public policy as expressed by
the Sherman Antitrust Laws), contract principles are no longer applicable. Therefore, using the rule of reason in an employer-employee
contract was improper when in reality there was a joint conspiracy
among all the owners of the NFL to engage in price fixing. The employees were forced to bind themselves to this price fixing conspiracy
by signing the Standard Player Contract. If players refused to sign,
they were subject to a group boycott, as was Joe Kapp, and deprived
of earning a living in their chosen profession. Surely, even if contract
principles were to apply, the Standard Player Contract would be declared void as unconscionable.
As a further reason for using the rule of reason, Judge Sweigert
noted that the existence of the player-employee/club-owner relationship lent itself to collective bargaining. Judge Sweigert stated that
"[a]pplication of the absolute antitrust per se rules to all league rules
enforcing restrictions upon the players' free choice of employment
[would tend] to preclude collective bargaining negotiations for league
enforcement of some rules in this category which, considering the
unique nature and purpose of league sports, may be regarded by both
players and clubs as reasonably necessary in furtherance of their long
' The draft rule, tampering
range mutual interests."96
rule and Rozelle
92. Instant case at 13.

,93. 341 U.S. 593 (1950).
94. Id. at 598.
95. Instant case at 30.
96. Instant case at 15.
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rule are directly injurious to the players in that they create artificial
barriers in the market for players' services. Under no stretch of one's
imagination is it possible to envision a players' union negotiating with
the NFL to include these terms in their contract.97 The only reason
these clauses were "accepted" by the NFL Players Association 8 in
their old collective bargaining contract9 9 was that they did not have
enough collective strength to force the NFL owners to remove them. 10 0
Application of the per se rules to the specific clauses challenged by
Joe Kapp would have no detrimental effect upon any future negotiations in a collective bargaining agreement which both sides truly considered necessary for their mutual benefit and which was not illegal
0
under the antitrust laws.' '
IV.

IMPACT OF DECISION

Although Judge Sweigert decided the case by using the rule of
reason, he held that the Rozelle rule, draft rule and tampering rule
97. Quite the contrary, the NFL Players Association went on strike during the
months of June and July, 1974, to have these clauses, which they referred to as "freedom
issues" removed from the Standard Player Contract.
98. The NFL Players Association received official recognition from the National
Labor Relations Board as a labor union pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1973), and
as such is the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL players within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1973).
99. This contract was dated June 17, 1971 (but by its terms was retroactive to
'February 1, 1970), and lasted until January 30, 1974. Currently there is no collective
bargaining agreement in existence between the NFL and NFL Players Association.
100. This was evident in the NFL Players Association strike during the summer
of 1974, which was centered around what the players called "freedom issues." These
"freedom issues" called for the abolishment of the draft rule, tampering rule, option
clause, and Rozelle rule. The strike failed because the union could not prevent most
players from "strikebreaking." This was not because these players did not believe in
the "freedom issues" but rather, because the Players Association did not have enough
funds to pay the players in the event of a prolonged strike, thereby forcing the players
to honor their individual contracts with their respective teams.
101. Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), seems to suggest that
when unions participate with a combination of businessmen who have complete power
to eliminate all competition among themselves, a situation is created which is not within
the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris LaGuardia Act. Therefore, it is highly
speculative, whether an illegal agreement can be protected merely because it is negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement. As the Court in United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949), stated: "Benefits to organized
labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employer's chestnuts out of the antitrust
fires." Therefore it appears to have little effect on any future collective bargaining
agreement whether the antitrust violation is found to exist on a per se test rather than
by the rule of reason.
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were so patently unreasonable in their present form, that they violated the antitrust laws. Had Judge Sweigert used a per se test, these
rules would have been declared illegal and would have disappeared,
never to surface within the NFL Constitution and Bylaws again. Under
the existing decision, the NFL merely has to change these rules to
10 2
make them conform to what may be considered "reasonable."'
Judge Sweigert stated that the Rozelle rule "impose[s] restraint
virtually unlimited in time and extent"'10 3 thus going far beyond any
possible need for fair protection of the interests of the club employers. The NFL can modify the Rozelle rule by stating that it will take
effect only within the first year after a player becomes a free agent.
Similarly the draft rule was declared patently unreasonable insofar as
it permitted "virtual perpetual boycott of a draft prospect even when
the drafting club refuses or fails within a reasonable time to reach a
contract with a player."' 0 4 The NFL can modify the draft rule by
imposing a one-year limit in which the drafting team can own the
player's rights. After such time he becomes a free agent. The NFL
can argue that a one-year limit upon the application of both the Rozelle rule and draft rule is not patently unreasonable. As authority,
they can rely on Judge Sweigert's ruling that the option clause's one
year option on players' services does not "render it patently unreason-

able."105

As a result of basing his decision on the rule of reason, Judge
Sweigert's judgment will not have much impact on the present restrictions preventing competitive bidding for players' services. If the
one-year limit on the Rozelle and draft rules is declared reasonable,
these rules would still serve as a strong deterrent preventing players
from becoming free agents. There are few players who can afford to
sit out a full year without being paid. °6 This is particularly true of
players selected in the annual college draft who are coming directly
out of college and have not had a chance to save any money.
102.
would be
103.
104.

In his opinion, Judge Sweigert gave no explicit indication as to what changes
considered reasonable.
Instant case at 16.
Id.

105. Id. at 18.
106. This is evidenced by the unsuccessful players' strike of the summer of 1974,
during which the majority of players became "strikebreakers" so they could collect
their salaries.
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Perhaps the decision of Judge Sweigert which will have the most
far-reaching effect is that the one-man rule, 10 r vesting final decision of
any player grievance in the NFL Commissioner, is patently unreasonably. The NFL will now have to select an impartial arbitrator, or perhaps allow a representative from the NFL Players Association, to serve
on the panel with the Commissioner with both of them choosing a
third impartial arbitrator. 0 8 The NFL will no longer be allowed to
act as its own judge in deciding the grievances of the players. Tjhis fact
can lead to significant changes in the future, as any issue of "reasonableness" of player restrictions would be interpreted by the grievance
committee.
CONCLUSION

The antitrust laws dictated that the per se rule be applied in the
instant case. The application of such a rule would forever ban the
use of the draft rule, tampering rule, and Rozelle rule in any form.
No one can accurately foretell whether such a significant change in the
NFL Constitution and Bylaws would have a beneficial or detrimental
effect on professional football as we know it today. Therefore, this
author concludes that the trial judge should have left the decision to
Congress whether professional football should receive any special treatment under the antitrust laws because of what he deems to be the
"unique nature and purpose of sports league activities."' 0 9
BERNARD
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107. See note 9 supra.
108. The grievance committee which declared Jim "Catfish" Hunter a free agent
was composed of three such individuals. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, p. 1, col. 5.
109. Instant case at 12.

